John O. Farnsworth and Sharon Annette Farnsworth v. Soter\u27s Inc. : Brief of Soter\u27s Inc. Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff and Of Salt Lake County, Third Party Defendant and Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1969 
John O. Farnsworth and Sharon Annette Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc. 
: Brief of Soter's Inc. Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff and Of 
Salt Lake County, Third Party Defendant and Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Victor G. Sagers, Donald Sawaya, Fred R. Finlinson, and 
Harry D. Pugsley; Attorneys for Respondents 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Farnsworth v. Soter's Inc., No. 11626 (1969). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4776 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN 0. FARNSWORTH and 
SHARON ANNETTE FARNS-
WORTH, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SOTER'S INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Third-Party Case No. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 11626 
ROBERT B. SWANER and LOUISE 
S. SWANER, his wife, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, a body politic, and SAM F. 
SOTER, individually, 
Third-Party Def endanta and 
Reaponilenta. 
BRIEF OF SOTER'S INC. DEFENDANT AND 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AND OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, THIRD PARTY DEFEND-
ANT AND RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County 
HONORABLE STEWART M. HANSON, Judge 
R.RICH 
Stratford Avenue 
t Lake City, Utah 
for Appellants 
LED 
VICTOR G. SAGERS 
7321 South State 
Midvale, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent Soter& IDc:. 
DONALD SAWAYA 
C-220 Metropolitan Hall Of Justice 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent Salt Lake County 
FRED L. FINLINSON 
Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent Sain F. Soter 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondents, the Swanen 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE____ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------··--·---------- 7 
POINT I. THE PLAINTIFFS HA VE NOT 
BEEN DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW OR COM-
PENSATION.------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 




Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Utah 238, 57 P2d 246 ________ 14 
Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. West, 
55 Utah 357, 186 P. 114 -------------------------------------- 19 
Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Giles et al., 
59 Utah 54, 202 P. 543 ---------------------------------------- 19 
1 
Page 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County et al., IO Utah 417, 
354 P.2d I05 ----------------------------------------------·········· s 
Ogden Valley Trout & Resort Co. v. Lewis, 4I Utah 
I83, 125 P. 687 ---·-····--·····-········-·······-···-·············· rn 
Sine v. Helland et al., I8 U.2d 222. 4I8 P.2d 979.. s ; 
Simons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho I36, I I8 P2d 7 40 ........ 14 
State ex rel. Nichols v. Cherry, 22 Utah I, 60 P. 
1103 ----------------------------------------------------------·-············ rn 
Thompson et ux., v. Anderson et al., I07 U.331, 
153 P2d 665 -·········-·····------------·-·······-····-···-··········· 18 
Utah State Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Perkins et al., 
. 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 -···-···-------·····-···--·········· rn 
Utah Road Commission v. Hansen et ux, I4 U.2d 
305, 383 Pac.2d 917 -------------------···············-·····-··· 14 ! 
Wood v. R.G.W. Ry., 28 Utah 35I, 79 P. I82 ........ 19 
STATUTES 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, § IO --·················-········ Ii 
Rules of Practice in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District of the State of Utah -
Rule 8 ··········-···············-·····-·-·········--------······-········· 18 
Utah Code Annotated I953 - Title 78 Chapter 34 .... 8 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38 ( b) ............ 18 
TEXTS 
Ballentine' s Law Dictionary Third Edition 1969, 
Pages 8 and 9 ·····--··-········-·--··················-··············· 11 
11 
Page 
Black's Law Dictionary Third Edition, 
Pages 18 and 19 ------------------------------------------------ 11-12 
1 Am J2d Adj L l ---------------------------------------------------- 12 
I Am J2d 691 and 692 ------------------------------------------------ 12 
25 Am Jlst High § 153 ------------------------------------------------ 11 
2.5 Am Jur 2d, § 40 and 41 ------------ ------------------------------- 14 
28 C.J.S. fry §9 ( c) ---------------------------------------------------- 14 
1 C.J.S. 406 -----------------------------------------------------------···-·-- 9 
111 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN 0. FARNSVVORTH and ' 
SHARON ANNETTE FARNS-
WORTH, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SOTER'S INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and rPhird-Party 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HOBERT B. S\V ANER and LOUISE 
S. his wife, SALT LAKE 
cot:NTY, a body politic, and SAl\I F. 
SOI'ER, individually, 




BRIEF OF SOTER'S INC. DEFENDANT AND 
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF AND OF SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, THIRD PARTY DEFEND-
ANT AND 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs, by their brief, have attempted, for the 
first time, to make this an action for either condemnation 
1 
or inverse condemnation. However, the pleadings and 
evidence do not substantiate such a case as Plaintiffs 
in their First Cause of Action are seeking alleged darn. 
ages for the removal of an alleged right of way and 
in their Second Cause of Action are seeking restoration 
of said non-existant right of way. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff and Re- , 
spondent, Soter's Inc., as well as the Third Party De- i 
fendants and Respondents, seek to have the lower 
court's Judgment of Dismissal dated lVIarch 3, 1969 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, in their brief, have set forth a state· 
ment of facts which the Respondents feel contains 
some statements which are without support in the evi· 
dence and some facts that are either omitted or mis· 
conceive the pleadings and which are based upon 
suppositions or assumptions and are sought to draw 
unfair inferences. Therefore, it becomes inherent that 
the Respondent restate the facts in order that they may 
be correctly viewed. 
Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth, acquired the prop· 
erty, the subject of this lawsuit, as set forth in Plain· 
tiffs' Complaint, together with the property to the East 










Happy \Talley Inc. (Exhibit D-12) and that property 
coll;'eyed to Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth's, sister 
1E\h1biL D-13) consisting of approximately 120 acres 
in all, from Florence N. Stoven on June 7, 1943 (T. -
17\l and 185, Exhibit P-4). 
At the time Plaintiff acquired said 120 acres oj 
property there was a roadway running in an easterly 
and westerly direction North of but not contiguous to 
the North property line of Plaintiffs' property known 
a11d referred to as Creek Road (approximately 8200 
South Street) to a point approximately 10 feet 8 inches 
North and a little to the East of Plaintiffs' property, 
the subjed of this lawsuit, at which point said roadway 
turned North and ran northward to the bridge crossing 
Little Cottonwood Creek (Exhibit D-9). 
There was an opening in the fence running along 
the North boundary of Plaintiffs' property at the 
extreme northwest boundary of said property which 
Plaintiffs used to gain access onto the property con-
veyeJ to Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth's, sister and 
brother-in-law under date of March 23, 1959 (Exhibit 
D-13) and that remaining in the name of Plaintiffs. 
This opening still exists, is now, and has been at all times 
used by either Plaintiffs or John 0. Farnsworth's 
sister and brother-in-law (Jessops) , and has not been 
altered in any way, shape or form. There absolutely 
irere no other openings adjacent to or abutting any of 
Plaintiffs' property now owned or formerly owned by 
Plaintiffs, along the North boundary of the property 
3 
of the Plaintiffs and the South boundary of the proper\\ 
known and referred to as Oak Creek Estates Xo. 
which was formerly owned by the Defendants and ](t 
spondents, Swaners, and which is now owned by Soter 1 
Inc. The Salt Lake County Surveyor's Office has maJ, 
three ( 3) separate surveys of the old and new roadwa1, 
and surrounding properties and said three ( 3) separat 
surveys have been specifically tied into one anothu 
and correlated into Exhibits D-9 and D-19. ExMn 
D-9 emphatically shows that the southern most portlo!i . 
of the oiled portion of the old road varied in distai1cr ' 
from 14 feet 6 inches to 7 feet 6 inches from the Nurlli 
boundary of Plaintiffs' original property and also sho11i 
that the South portion of the old roadway was co11· 
siderably higher in elevation than the North boundan 1 
of the Plaintiffs' property, either in its original stair 
or as presently existing. 
The old roadway has been left intact in front 01 
the property formerly owned by Plaintiffs, but nm·. 
owned by Jessop's (Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3, D-9, D-Jll.1 
D-11, and D-13). 
The Plaintiffs on April 10, 1958 by Warrann 
Deed, conveyed all of their property abutting their 
present one acre on the East and South to Happi. 
Valley Inc. (Exhibit D-12) and all of the propert.1 
to the West of said one acre tract to Plaintiff, J on 11 
0. Farnsworth's, sister and brother-in-law, David L 
Jessop and Noleen F. Jessop, his wife, on March z:i. 
1959 as is shown by Exhibit D-13, without reservini 
4 
any entrance whatsoever to the remammg one acre, 
either from the West, or the East, or the South. Plain-
tiffs, of course, had absolutely no other opening to their 
remaining acre at any point along the South side of said 
old roadway other than that conveyed to Jessops by 
the above mentioned Deed. 
The property conveyed to Happy Valley Inc. has 
been developed into Willow Creek Subdivision No. 2 
(Exhibit P-2) with the South portion of Plaintiffs' 
and Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth' s sister and brother-
i11-law, N oleen F. Jessop and David L. Jessop's, prop-
erty abutting Rubidoux Road. Both Plaintiffs and the 
Jessops have a ready-made access to the South portion 
1Jf their respective properties by merely reimbursing 
the Willow Creek subdividers for a nominal sum 
for said protective strip as is outlined in Exhibit D-18. 
Salt Lake County, because of a hazardous con-
diton of said old roadway, (T. - 185 and 186) on Sep-
tember 15, 1958 and September 17, 1958 (Exhibits 
D-17 and D-16) exchanged Quitclaim Deeds with 
Third-Party Defendants Swaners, with Third-Party 
Defendants Swaners quitclaim:!ng any interest in and 
to the new realignment of Creek Road as shown on 
Exhibits D-9, D-10, and D-11, to Salt Lake County 
and Salt Lake County quitclaimiug any interest in 
the old 8200 South Street known as Creek Road to 
Third-Party Defendants, Swaners, and which property 
was later transferred to Defendant and Third-Party 
5 
Plaintiff, Soter's Inc., and is evidenced by Exhibit\ 
D-15 and D-24. 
The realignment of the new 8200 South Street wa1 1 
made by Salt Lake County in the late summer or earh 
fall of 1959 with the new roadway being paved in tr;e 
spring of 1960. A pile of dirt was put on the old 
roadway stopping access to the use of same at a point 
East of the opening into the Jessop property and the 
1 
County scarified the entire rest of the old roadway 
to Little Cottonwood Creek. Said old roadway remained · 
blocked and scarified until approximately June 11, 
1964 at which time Defendant and Third-Party Plain-
tiff, Soter's Inc., caused the old roadway to be com-
pletely obliterated. There is no dispute as to when the 1 
new realignment took place but there is some dispute · 
between the parties hereto as to how long the Plaintiffs 
continued to use the old roadway. However, no com-
plaint was made by Plaintiffs whatsoever from 1959 
until approximately September 12, 1964 at which time 
Sam F. Soter of Soter' s Inc. requested the use of the 1, 
Jessop's telephone because of car trouble and at this 
time Mrs. Jessop discussed said old roadway with Mr. 
Soter (T. - 208 and 215, Deposition - Page 13). 
Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth, by his testimony : 
stated that he had not planted, used, grazed, or built 
or requested permission to build upon the one acre of 
property, or lived there, at any time from the time 
the property was sold to Happy Valley Inc. or h11 
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sister, which amounts to approximately seven years 
('f.-205, 206, and 216, Deposition-Pages 11and12). 
The Third-Party Defendants, Swaners, sold the 
property known as Oak Creek Estates No. 3 (Exhibit 
P-l), together with other property, to Sam F. Soter 
oil or about l\1-ay 15, 1959 with title passing to Sam F. 
Soter on .J\ilay 29, 1964 (Exhibit D-15) and the same 
being transferred by deed to Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff, Soter's Inc., the same day (Exhibit 
D-24<). Soter's Inc. did not include into Oak Creek 
Estates No. 3 the triangular 115 foot by 39.17 foot 
strip shown on Exhibits P-1, D-10, and D-11 beginning 
at a point 1,901.66 feet East of the Southwest corner 
of the Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 2.f$v..t{ 1 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; the 
road and access to the property now owned by Jessops, 
and formerly owned by Plaintiffs, was left intact. 
The Plaintiffs now have the same openings as 
they always had into their property except that they 
choose to convey the only opening to Jessops in 1959 
!Exhibits P-2, P-3 and D-13) and to landlock them-
selves on the East and South when they conveyed to 
Happy Valley Inc. in 1958, as shown by Exhibits P-2, 
P-3 and D-12. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT 
BREN DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITH-
7 
OUT DUE PROCESS OF LA \V OR COMPEX 
SATION. 
It appears that the Plaintiffs have misconceive, 
their own case as their entire argument contained •. · 
Point 1 lies solely in quotations from the Fifth a111 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution as Wt 
as recitations from surrounding states' cases and otht 
cases sounding solely in condemnation and inverse c01, 
demnation. 
Neither Plaintiffs' pleadings nor any evideur 
adduced at the trial sounds whatsoever either in emine: 
domain or inverse condemnation. The only place th• 
such argument is treated is in Plaintiffs' brief 
stated above, is not substantiated whatsoever by eith' 
the pleadings or the evidence and therefore should n' 
be considered here. 
The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Sotei 
Inc., does not come within the classification of 1: 
parties allowed to invoke the rights of the emintr 
domain statutes as set forth in Title 78 Chapter :r 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and the doctrine of "ime1: 
condemnation" has been repeatedly rejected in ii 
State of Utah as is evidenced by the cases of fa 
clough v. Salt Lake County et al., 10 U.2d Jr 
354 P.2d 105, and Sine v. Helland et.al., 18 U.2d 
418 P.2d 979 and ancillary cases referred to in e: 
of said cases. 
Plaintiffs attempt to apply some condemnationa 
8 
j111 erse eondemnation rules to the instant case by claim-
iiw that their property abuts the Defendant and Third-
b 
Party Plaintiff and Respondent's property upon which 
tlie ol<l road was and by alleging that they are abutters 
and that they own to the center of the old roadway, 
11 hich "va·; North some 7 to 15 feet of the Defendant's 
;.;odli property line. Plaintiffs also allege that if they 
cannot become abutters then they have a right by pre-
scription, which argument is also fallacious. 
To show the fallacy jn Plaintiffs' contention as 
being an abutter and having rights, either as an abutter 
or a prescriptive right, it is necessary that we look to 
tlie true definition of these respective words which Plain-
tiffs seem to have overlooked. 
Corpus Juris Secundum in 1 C.J.S. 406 defines 
"abut" as follows: 
"ARUT. In its most ordinary sense, "abut" 
means to be contiguous, or border on; to bound 
upon; to end, end at, or terminate, to join at 
a border or boundary; to meet; to touch at the 
end or side. Usually "abut" implies contact, but 
this is not always so. 
Phrases: *Abubagainst• the solid rock," 
on the highway," "abuts or adjoins," "abuts upon 
the improvement," and "abuts upon the street." 
"Abutting" is a word of common usage, hav-
ing a definite, well understood meaning, as well 
in legal as in common parlance. It has been de-
fined as meaning adjacent; adjoining; coming 
together; contiguous; ending; joined to; meet-
ing; touching. It has been said that it conveys 
9 
the idea of bordering on, bounded by, with not/
1 
ing intervening. While the word "abutting" ma1 
not imply that the things spoken of are nece; 
sarily in contact, the usual meaning conveyeu 
is that of touching or coming together. (Em. 
phasis added) 
In a narrow and restricted sense the term b 
used in reference to that which touches at tht 
end as distinguished from that which adjoin1 
it on the side. In ordinary usage, however, it;, 
said to have no restricted sense, but to refer to 
that which touches other premises whether ai 
the ends or on the sides; and it has also been 
said not to include land lying wholly within, 
although in a particular connection, the use oi' 
the word may convey the idea of abutting ana 
lying partially within. 
"Abutting" has been distinguished from "ad 
jacent_" "fronting," "occupying," and "tribu-
tary." 
Phrases: "Abutting, adjoining, contiguous, 
"abutting and occupying," "abutting, contiguou1 
and tributary," "abutting each other," "abutting 
its line," "abutting lands," "abutting lot," abut· 
ting on or adjacent to," "abutting on such lat· 
erals," "abutting on the improvement," 
or adjacent real estate," "abutting or fronting. 
"abutting owner," "abutting platted lots," "ab.ul· 
property," "abutting property owner," "abuttmi 
railroad property,"" 'abutting' the street," "abut 
ting unplatted property," "abutting ad 
jacent, vicinal or proximate to the street, abut: 
ting upon such avenue," "abutting upon the str.ee! 
or streets," "adjacent or abutting," "borderW 
or abutting upon street or streets," "contiguow 
10 
property abutting," "facing or abutting upon 
the improvement," "fronting or abutting feet," 
"fronting or abutting upon," "lands not imme-
diately abutting,' 'and "occupying or abutting 
any highway." 
ABUTTER. One whose property abuts, is 
contiguous, or joins at a border or boundary, 
as where no other land, road, or street inter-
venes ; the word has sometimes been spelled 
"abuttor." " 
Black's Law Dictionary Third Edition, Pages 18 
and 19 define "abutter" and "abutting owner" as fol-
lows; 
"ABUTTER. One whose property abuts, is 
contiguous, or joins at a border or boundary as 
where no other land, road, ort:eet intervenes. 
ABUTTING OWNER. owner of land 
which abuts or adjoins. The term usually im-
plies that the relative parts actually adjoin, but 
is sometimes loosely used without implying more 
than close proximity. See Abut." 
The most recently legal dictionary, namely, Bal-
lentine's Law Dictionary Third Edition 1969, at Pages 
8 and 9 defines "abut" and "abutting owner" as follows: 
"ABUT. To end at; to border on; to reach 
or touch with an end, as where a lot touches the 
highway. Hensler v. Anacortes, 140 Wash 184, 
248 p 406. 
ABUTTING O':VNERS. Those owners 
whose lands touch a highway or other public 
place. I Am J2d Adj L § I; 25 Am Jlst High 
§ 153. 
11 
. It is to limit the meaning of "a bu 
tmg owners to lands bordering a highway a
11
, 
not to speak of lands as "adjoining" a high 11::·, 
but the usefulness of a distinction in legal arfo: 
between lands that abut on a highway and ::ii 
joining lands generally, arbitrary awl 
although it may be, is not to be derned. J \ 
J2d Adj L §I." . ' 
The term "abutter" or "abutting owner" is som 
times referred to as adjoining land owner and I ,:\1 
J2d 691 and U92 defines "adjoinng landOWllCl'S I 
follows: 
"As the term is used in legal termi11olog: 
"adjoining landowners" are the owners of lm11, 
that are separated by a common boundary. 'l'J; 
word "lands" includes to\',:n and city lots \\t 
as rural property. Lands have been held lo ar: 
join, within this rule, although they are sep, 
rated by a public street. "Adjoining 
however, are held to be premises which toUt 
or are connected with premises of another, , 
distinguished from premises lying near or uiJ 
jacen! thereto. The ordinary meaning oft!. 
words "contiguous territory" is not territor 
nearby in the neighborhood or locality, but lt: 
ritory touching, adjoining, and connecting, : 
distinguished from territory separated by oth1 
territory. The word "adjoining" implies coni 
guity in describing lands. 
Lands which lie along, and are bordered h, 
a highway "adjoin" the highway in a lite1 
sense of the word, but as used in this work a1' 
in legal literature generally, the phrase "abutti11 
owners" is used to designate those whose Ian 
touch a highway or other public place. The di· 
12 
tinction is wholly arbitrary, but it answers a 
useful purpose in that it gives a definite and 
distinctive classification and avoids confusion 
that might otherwise arise. 
In considering the rights, duties, and liabili-
tiles of adjoining landowners, it should be kept 
in mind that land has in its legal signification an 
indefinite extent upward, and includes every-
thing terrestrial, not only the ground or soil, but 
everything which is attached to the earth, 
whether by the course of nature, as trees, herb-
age, and water, or by the hands of man, as houses 
and other buildings." 
It is evident from the foregoing definitions as well 
as the exhibits and evidence before the court that it is 
!illpossible for the Plaintiffs to be classified as an abut-
ting property owner when in fact their property line 
ends at the section line and the old roadway was a 
considerable distance North of the section line and 
property line and at a different elevation than Plain-
tiffs' property with no openings being available or ever 
having been used by the Plaintiffs from their North 
boundary to said old roadway (T. - 197, 203, and 246, 
Deposition Pages 5 and 15) except the one opening 
into Plaintiff, John 0. Farnsworth's, sister and brother-
in-law's, Jessop's, place which has not been altered by 
either the Defendant or by any of the Third-Party 
Defendants (Exhibit D-10 and D-ll) and which is 
in its original location and condition. 
Plaintiffs admit both from the evidence (T. - 181) 
and in their own brief that the old roadway was created 
13 
by prescription and by public dedication and that thtl't 
were no openings that had been used on the Plaintitt, 
North property line except that into what is now kn0111 , 
as the Jessop property formerly owned by the Plain. 
tiffs and conveyed to Jessops ( T. - 202) . 
It has been stated that any person capable 111 
receiving a grant of an easement may acquire one n: 
prescription. \Vhile legally organized or political e11. 
tities may acquire an easement by prescription, the 
general public is incapable of receiving a grant and 
hence, according to some courts, cannot acquire a pre-
scriptive easement. Bertolina v. Frates, 89 Utah 
57 P2d 346. Nor can one acquire title by adverse uset 
where his use is as a member of the public, in comrno11 
with all others exercising and enjoying the pririlege 
of use, Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 Piu 
7 40, since the use in such a case is not exclusive. i.i 
Am J ur 2d, § 40 and 41 on Prescription. 
An easement may be acquired by prescription li1 
private property; but, by the weight of authority, it 
cannot be so acquired in property held for public use 
28 C.J.S. §9(c). 
The Plaitdiffs at page 8 of their brief cite Utal1 
Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 305, 383 Pac.2a 
917, in support of their position, however, this case also 
specifies as follows: 
"Absent an established easement, all that abul· 
ting owner is entitled to is some reasonable mearn 
14 
-
of access to highway the same as all other mem-
bers of the public." 
"Owners of property abutting on a street were 
not entitled to additional compensation on ground 
that limitation of access would lessen value of 
the remainng land should they desire to divide 
and sell it into smaller pieces." 
In the instant case the Plaintiff's were not abutters, 
did not have a prescriptive easement as they never, as 
the evidence overwhelmingly substantiates, had an open-
ing in their fence nor used the property all along the 
North boundary of their remaining property to gain 
access to the old roadway for the reason that the street 
was further to the North than their North boundary 
and also that there was no opening other than that 
transferred by the Plaintiffs to the Jessops, as well 
as there being a difference in elevation (Exhibit D-9). 
Therefore, they had no easement, could not lose some-
thing they never had and were not entitled to, and were 
not abutting property owners and under any stretch 
of the imagination could not own to the center of a road 
which was on someone else's property. 
There is absolutely no dispute that when the new 
road was opened up in 1959 the general public speci-
fically used that road from that time on. Salt Lake 
County abandoned said old road, having transferred 
same to Third-Party Defendants, Swaners, and Swa-
ners in turn having transferred said old roadway to 
Sam F. Soter, Third-Party Defendant and Respondent, 
who in turn transferred same to the Defendant and 
15 
. -h'tf , 
Third-Party Defc:atknt, Soter s Inc. The old road 
being a public dedicated roadway, and the public ha1 j11, 
been furnished a means of reasonable access, the Plaii: 
tiffs, still retaining the access that they already had. 
certainly had no reason to complain\ at a subsetpieul · 
date because they landlocked themselves. 
Plaintiffs have a better and paved street with curb anu 
gutter which they can acquire from the developers 01 
Willow Creek Subdivision by paying a nominal surn 
as is evidenced by Exhibit D-18. 
Assuming that the Plaintiffs are abutters, whicl1 
we expressly deny, and quoting from Plaintiffs' 01111 
brief at Page 18, Plaintiffs specify as follows: 
"Before an abutter is entitled to compensatio11 
for the impairment of his access rights, he mu1: 
show that he suffers a special injury, 
in kind and not merely in degree from that suf· 
fered by the public in general." 
"The.!hutter is not entitled to access at all point· 
of his property, and as long as a suitable mm' 
of access is left to him, he has suffered no lega1 . . ,, 
lllJUry ... 
Here Plaintiffs, even if abutters, which they an 
not, have suffered no injury as they still would han 
had the same access, if they had not conveyed it to tn1 
Jessops, as they had prior to the installation of tli' 
new roadway. 
Plaintiffs at Page 21 of their brief improper]:, 
attempt to invoke a 1965 Session Law to the instanr 
16 
case and attempt to retroactively apply same in con-
nedion with the abandonment of the old highway, 
which, by Defendant's contention, was in 1959 and by 
Plaintiffs' contention, was in 1963 and/or 1964. This 
theory, of eourse, must also fail for two reasons: ( 1) 
Said law cannot be applied retroactively, and (2) said 
law would not be applicable even if in force at the time 
of abandonment for the reasons previously stated. 
Point 2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DEXYING PLAINTIFFS A JURY TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs, in their argument of Point 2, again 
attempt to imply that they have been denied due pro-
cess by asserting that it is a fundamental procedure 
and right in American Jurisprudence to have a jury 
trial and that same should not be lightly denied. 
It will be noted that Plaintiffs filed their Complaint 
iu the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office on 1\-larch 17, 
1906, their Motion of Readiness on February 6, 1967, 
said case had been pretried and many Motions heard, 
yet Plaintiffs' Notice and lVIotion for a Jury Trial was 
uot made until February 14, 1969, just a few days 
prior to the time the case was set for trial, which would 
appear to be just a little bit tardy. 
This court has ruled on this question on many 
occasions and this matter of demand for a jury trial 
is covered by the following: 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH: Art. 1, § 
10 - Trial by Jury - "In capital cases the right 
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of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courb 
of general jurisdiction, except in capital cases 
a jury shall consits of eight jurors. In eourts 0; 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall eonsist of tom 
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 11, 
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of tht · 
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil case 
shall be waived unless demanded." 
added) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PHCJO: 
DURE: Rule 38 (b) Demand - "Any pai\1 
may demand a trial by jury of any issue triahl, 
of right by a jury by paying the statutory jm:1 
fee and serving upon the other parties a demann 
therefor in writing at a11y time after the com· 
mencement of the action and not later than shali 
be fixed by rule of the court in which the action 
is pend_in__g. Such demand may be indorsed upo11 
a pleading of the party." 
RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DlS 
TRICT COURT OF THE THIRD Jrm 
CIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE m 
UTAH: Rule 8 Jury Demand - "Any cast 
originally set for trial without a jury may nmr· 
theless be set for jury trial, provided that writte11 
notice and payment of the jury fee be deposite1I 
with the clerk of the court not later than the pn 
trial conference of said action." 
This court in Thompson et ux, v. Anderson et ni 
107 U.331, 153 P2d 665, says as follows: 
"It is a matter of discretion with the court to c 
allow or refuse a demand for a jury, when no 
made within statutory time or extended tm11 
provided by court rule, and it is not an abui 
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of discretion to refuse a late demand for jury 
trial if no excuse is shown for failure to make 
timely demand." 
The court, in the same case, further specifies as 
follows: 
"\Vhere Defendant filed motion for jury trial 
after case was set on nonjury calendar, but not 
within required time limit as provided by court 
rule, extending statutory time limit for such 
motion, and, gave as justification therefor that 
he was giving consideration to overtures of plain-
tiffs which tended toward settlement of case, 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
motion." 
See also the following Utah cases: 
\Vood v. R.G.,V. Ry., 28 Utah 351, 79 P. 182; 
Ogden Valley Trout & Resort Co. v. Lewis, 41 
Utah 183, 125 P. 687; Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City v. West, 55 Utah 357, 186 P. 
114; Utah State Building & Loan Ass'n. v. 
Perkins et al., 53 Utah 47 4, 173 P. 950; Emer-
son-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Giles et al., 
59 Utah 54, 202 P. 543; State ex rel. Nichols 
r. Cherry, 22 Utah l, 60 P. ll03. 
It is evident from the foregoing cases, all directly 
in point, that the Plaintiffs' demand for jury trial came 
too late, that they had waived their right to a jury trial, 
alld that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Plaintiffs' motion at such a late date. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is evident irom the evidenl'.e, the record, awl 1 
exhibits that none of the Defendants have inJur. 
the Plaintiffs in any way whatsoever. Plaintitl's sa 11 '" 
to convey their property to Happy Y alley Inc. u11r! 
the Jessops without retaining a right of way into tlit. 
own property. However, they do have a right of i: 
to the South of their p1•operty as their property aLu 
Rubidoux Road. Neither the Defendant nor Th1, 
Party Defendants have taken away any rights 
soever from the Plaintiffs as they never had any 
other than what they retained or chose to come) 
someone else. The approach and opening Ly 1: 
J e!Wps, which was conveyed by the Plaintiffs to t 
J is as it was and has been for the past nurnen 
years. Plaintiffs' property never did abut the r0mh1: 
nor did Plaintiffs have a right by prescripti011 to ).i 
roadway, the fee of which was formerly owned : 
Swaners and which was conveyed by mesne comr 
ances to the Defendant, Soter' s Inc. 
We have here simply a matter and a co11dii 
that Plaintiffs have created themselves. 
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